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This paper examines relative power relations in Asia between
the United States and China while assessing how the United
States might approach a potential change in the balance of
power of the region. The United States, under President Trump,
has enacted numerous policies that target the rise of Chinese
power, but most appear to be protectionist measures. These
include the application of tariffs on Chinese imported goods,
investigations that bypass multilateral institutions on China’s
coercive economic behavior and the removal of the United States
from Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations. This paper uses
empirical findings and employs the lens of realism to analyze
the implications of the Trump Administration’s policies. The
findings display that President Trump’s policies to date are not
an effective balance against China’s rising power, and they may
potentially lead to a decline of the United States’ power in Asia.
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The Emergence of China and Necessity to Respond
A few decades ago when the United States supported China’s
rise into the global trading system, it accelerated the country’s
growth and hastened its rise as a geopolitical rival.1 Over time,
China privatized state owned enterprises, eliminated tariffs,
opened up the country to foreign investment and joined the
World Trade Organization. These actions led to unprecedented
economic growth, and now China is the second largest economy
in the world by aggregate GDP.2 During its economic rise,
China has not always followed the institutional rules that are
at the heart of the current international system. For example,
China has taken steps to increase its power in the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank in order to serve its own
purposes and has economically coerced its neighbors.3 It has
also built up incredible military strength which is used to defend
its illicit territorial claims of “indisputable sovereignty” over
land and maritime territory covering most of the South China
Sea.4 Although many US officials hoped China would one day
become a responsible stakeholder in the international system,
it has not behaved in a way that satisfies this expectation.
What’s more, President Xi Jinping and the Communist
Party of China continue to push forward expansion plans. The
Belt and Road Initiative, launched in 2013, aims to create a
Eurasian trade route dominated by China and further expand and
diversify the country’s economy.5 To help fund the infrastructural
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development, China founded the Asian Infrastructure Investment
Bank in 2015, of which eighty countries have joined.6 A trade
route of the size President Xi has in mind would be competitive
with the Transatlantic trade route dominated by the United
States, which causes concern in Washington. If the Belt and
Road Initiative were successfully completed, Chinese currency,
technical standards and preferences for trade as a whole would be
more widely accepted throughout the continent.7 Infrastructure
is a great vehicle for expanding influence, and this project is
one of the most obvious signs from China that the country
has a mission of solidifying its position as a great regional
power. A result of the many recent developments, countries in
the region see Asia as “increasingly dominated by adversarial
power relations” between the United States and China.8
The two fundamental objectives at stake are China’s
need for economic growth to avoid collapse and the United
States’ need for maintaining its order to ensure security. For
now, the United States remains an influential power in Asia.
But the rise of China has reached a point where the country
has the ability to change the balance of power of the region
in its favor over the United States. This is evident through
its military buildup, activities in the South China Sea, and
coercive economic diplomacy, amongst other actions.9
It is natural for regional hegemons to oppose the rise
of other hegemons in order to have no competitors for global
hegemony.10 Therefore, the United States does not want China to
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achieve hegemony in Asia. This assumption is formed under the
guidelines of renowned political scientist John Mearsheimer’s
“offensive realism” theory, which assumes that states will seek
to gain as much power as possible and pursue hegemony when
the circumstances are right.11 Under these assumptions, China’s
economic and military rise can be interpreted as an attempt
to remove the United States from a position of dominance in
the region and gain regional hegemony. Also following these
assumptions, the United States needs to take steps to maintain
economic, political and military balance in Asia in order to
ensure China does not achieve its goal. Although there is
a strong conception that the US exerts too much effort to
project power around the globe, Mearsheimer presents a more
focused strategy which he refers to as “offshore balancing.”12
The strategy identifies Asia as one region with the
potential to produce a hegemon with “abundant economic clout”
and ability to project power around the globe.13 Therefore, the
United States must actively engage with countries throughout
Asia to ensure a hegemon does not arise. China has explicitly
stated it does not seek to remove the United States’ presence
from the region, nor achieve hegemony, and to some, its actions
in the South China Sea can be interpreted as no more than
an attempt to guarantee its own free movement throughout
the territory.14 Yet, another essential part of realist theory
is that states do not and cannot know the true intentions of
other states.15 Considering former Chinese president Deng
Xiaoping’s dictum of laying low and hiding capabilities
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while developing strength still influences Chinese strategic
thought, the United States should interpret Chinese actions in
Asia as attempts to increase its relative power over the US.
Even if realist theory were untrue, East Asia is still the
most important region for the United States’ global economic and
security interests because of its economic capacity.16 The South
China Sea is vital to the United States as it carries one-third of global
maritime worth and provides access through the Indo-Pacific,
another economically vibrant sub-region.17 Great powers also
tend to entrench their influence by using regional institutions.18
If China were to dominate this area, surrounding countries
would succumb to Chinese pressure, harming the United States
liberal international order. The authoritarian state of China holds
less regard for human or political rights than the United States,
and it has already showed signs of trying to impose its ways of
domestic politics on its neighbors.19 Currently, China undergoes
a forced migration of moving 250 million rural residents into
newly constructed cities in order to ignite economic growth.20
Not only does the migration represent the CPC’s
disregard for the individuality of China’s own citizens, it shows
its willingness to assert authoritarian power in order to make
economic gains. Since World War II, the United States has led
the effort to create and expand open trade systems out of selfinterest.21 The success of a system like the Belt and Road Initiative
or the solidification of power in the South China Sea could allow
China to take a more leading role in this expansion, which it
Ian Bremmer, Superpower: Three Choices for America’s Role in the World (New York, NY:
Penguin Publishing Group, 2015)
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could use to reflect its own interests. Given these circumstances,
the United States must take concrete steps to maintain influence
in Asia in order to balance China’s emerging power in the region.
Thus, the rest of this paper will examine the actions of President
Trump’s Administration that pertain to China’s emergence
and the implications of these policies to determine how
effectively they maintain balanced power with China in Asia.
The Trump Administration’s Policies Towards China and Asia
President Trump began making serious decisions
about the United States’ involvement in Asia on his first
weekday of office. On January 23, 2017, President Trump
withdrew the United States from the twelve country trade
deal called the Trans-Pacific Partnership.22 The agreement was
brokered by former president Barack Obama and intended to
remove both “tariff and non-tariff trade barriers” between the
twelve countries, including Japan and Australia, and decrease
the Asian region’s economic dependence on China.23 In a
memorandum released by the Office of the Press Secretary
regarding the withdrawal, President Trump stated that trade
is of “paramount importance” to his administration, but he
would pursue trade on a more advantageous “bilateral” basis.24
On the other hand, The Congressional Research Service of
the Library of Congress observed that the agreement could be used
as a “vehicle to advance wider Asia-Pacific free trade area” and
could “deepen U.S. integration in a vibrant region for the future.”25
However, President Trump did not believe in these possibilities
based on his executive decision to leave the TPP. The negotiations
Peter Baker, “Trump Abandons Trans-Pacific Partnership: Obama’s Signature Trade Deal,”
The New York Times, January 23, 2017.
23
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continued without the United States, and on March 8, 2018, the
remaining eleven countries signed the agreement renamed the
Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership.26
The signing of the new Trans-Pacific Partnership
agreement occurred around the same time President Trump
unilaterally announced a massive tariff of 25% on imported
steel and 10% on aluminum in the United States. He argued
that the overcapacity in the market for these goods was due
to China’s state-backed economic policies.27 To justify the
import tariffs, President Trump ordered the US Department
of Commerce to launch an investigation under Section 232
of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which has not been
used since the creation of the WTO in 1995, on the effects of
steel and aluminum on national security.28 If they were able
to determine that the actions of China were a threat to the
country’s security, the tariffs could be legally accepted. Oddly,
China only accounts for 2% of US steel imports, so the tariffs
are unlikely to inflict too much damage on its economy.29
Yet President Trump continues to escalate tariffs in response to
China’s “unfair retaliation.”30 When China published a list of
$50 billion dollars of American products to be hit with tariffs on
April 4, 2018, President Trump threatened additional tariffs on
$100 billion of Chinese goods.31 President Trump also initiated
an investigation into China’s alleged intellectual property
theft under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 on August
Eva Vergara and Luis A. Henao, “11 Nations sign Pacific trade pact as Trump plans US
tariffs,” AP News, March 8, 2018.
27
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14, 2017.32 Section 301 gives the US Trade Representative
broad authority to take measures against a foreign countries
unfair trade practices, of which President Trump accuses
China of having.33 Specifically, the US is challenging China
for performing forced technology transfers, where if a US
company wishes to do business with other Chinese firms, they
are forced to share their intellectual property. These United
States investigations also bypass the World Trade Organization
and could lead to broad sanctions and restrictions on China,
which would provoke retaliatory measures against the US.34
While President Trump’s economic policies surely
intend to cause damage to China, it is unclear how much
damage they will also inflict on the United States or other
countries around the world. Officials have argued that while
tariffs on Chinese goods do not intend to help American
industry, they are necessary to prevent China from continuing
to “violate international trade rules.”35 Rather than prompt
China to change its behavior, the administration’s tariffs so
far have sparked retaliation that especially targets American
carmakers and soybean farmers.36 Whether the administration’s
economic policies are attempts to actively maintain a regional
balance in Asia or simply unilateral movements to encourage
China to adapt to the rules of global institutions is unclear.
Sticking to offensive realist theory, the United States
also needs to balance Chinese military power. During Trump’s
presidential tenure, China has continued to claim additional
land territory, and the country has deployed “increasingly
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sophisticated” military assets onto its artificially created islands
in the South China Sea.37 While the administration was more
involved in other Asian affairs in 2017, moving forward it appears
prepared to tackle the growing military threat that China presents.
The 2018 National Defense Strategy released by the
Department of Defense clearly argues that China is coercing
neighbors and pursuing a military modernization program to
achieve “Indo-Pacific regional hegemony” in the near term and
“displacement of the United States” in the future.38 Key objectives
for the United States, according to the National Defense Strategy,
include maintaining “favorable regional balances of power” in the
Indo-Pacific and “defending allies from military aggression.”39
Furthermore, the National Security Strategy of 2017 stated that
in Asia, the United States would strengthen partnerships with
countries like Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia
to help them become “cooperative maritime partners.”40
Since releasing the National Defense Strategy, the
administration has sent a US missile destroyer within 12
nautical miles of the Chinese occupied Scarborough Shoal
as a gesture to challenge its occupation.41 It has also sent
Defense Secretary James Mattis to Indonesia and Vietnam. To
afford using the military to counter China, President Trump
also proposed a $716 billion increase in the defense budget
for 2019 earlier this year.42 While President Trump’s military
policies towards Asia are still developing, they appear strong
Richard J. Heydarian, “The Trump Administration’s South China Sea Policy Takes Shape,”
China-US Focus (February 2, 2018).
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and focused on maintaining a regional balance of power.
Implications of the Trump Administration’s Policies
Towards China and Asia
Now that many of the Trump Administration’s significant policies
directed at Asia have been presented, their implications can be
analyzed. The first of President Trump’s economic decisions in
Asia, the withdrawal of the US from TPP agreements, was not an
effective approach at balancing China’s power in the region. For
President Trump to keep the United States’ regional presence
strong, one analyst argued, he would need to “expand economic
and investment relations in Southeast Asia” and “provide further
development assistance.”43 Although he pursues bilateral trade
agreements with other states, President Trump has yet to find
many countries willing to negotiate one.44 President Trump
may not be successful in expanding economic relations in Asia
because the world will continue lowering trade barriers with or
without the United States.45 An obvious example of this is the
fact that the other eleven countries signed the Comprehensive
and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership. According to Joshua
Meltzer, a senior fellow at Brookings Institution, the agreement
is now a “trade-bloc that discriminates against the US.”46 He
went on to say that the ability of the US to shape the rules of
trade in the region is now diminished. Furthermore, the Chilean
foreign minister recognized that the signing of the agreement
was a strong sign by the countries involved against protectionist
pressures and in favor of a world open to free trade.47
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A realist perspective argues for the United States to consciously
balance China’s rise by developing new, trusted strategic
relationships throughout the Indo-Pacific region.48 Yet,
President Trump’s economic policies have not succeeded in
building these relationships. While the steel and aluminum
tariffs are unlikely to affect China as much as other countries,
they send a negative message about the United States’ trade
policy and impede the ability to mount an effective coalition
of countries to counter China’s unfair trade practices.49 Rather,
they punish allies in North America and the European Union,
causing political damage. It is likely that the US will need
to strongly justify its tariffs on the basis of national defense
in order to avoid going through a WTO dispute resolution
process.50 If the US lost the legal battle, it would be required
to remove the implementation of its steel and aluminum tariffs.
The United States could ignore the ruling, but then
other states could legally invoke countermeasures to the US
imposed tariffs, sending the world down a dangerous path of
protectionism.51 President Trump is correct to point out that
China engages in unfair trade practices, but he addresses the
problem in a harmful manner. In 2017, Xi Jinping became the
first Chinese leader to attend the World Economic Forum, where
he gave a keynote speech that notably condemned protectionist
policies. In his speech, President Xi announced that China would
remain “committed to promoting free trade and investment
through opening up and saying no to protectionism.”52 As China
follows the rest of the world by advancing free trade, it could be
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detrimental to the United States to go the route of protectionism.
The steel and aluminum tariffs have already sparked
retaliation from states, but the Section 301 investigations
could cause even more damage. If followed through, they will
almost surely result in China responding with similar tariffs,
damaging the US economy by raising consumer prices.53
In a hearing before the Section 301 Committee Office of the
United States Trade Representative, Scott Kennedy did argue
that IP is an instrumental tool in a “larger contest of economic
power” with China.54 However, Kennedy also claimed that
if the United States “gives up efforts to create multilateral
rules… it will leave wide swaths of global commerce
with outdated rules or empty spaces without any rules.”55
Rather than utilize multilateral rules and guidelines
under the World Trade Organization, President Trump made
a unilateral decision to attack China by launching the Section
301 investigations. The administration should consider more
effective ways to protect the intellectual property rights of
Americans. Besides using the World Trade Organization to
investigate China’s intellectual property theft, the Trans-Pacific
Partnership could have been an effective tool in preventing
China from using its IP policies. The agreement’s high standards
could have encouraged China to improve its practices regarding
intellectual property.56 But when the United States abandoned the
negotiations, the remaining countries removed the provisions on
intellectual property that the US was demanding.57 By removing
the provisions, China will not have to face the pressure that
Daniel Rosen, “Is Trade War the Only Option? An Alternative Approach to Taking On
China,” Foreign Affairs (March 20, 2018).
54
Scott Kennedy, “China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer,
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55
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would have been created by the original TPP to abide by them.
There appears to be a lack of trust with the Trump
Administration in the multilateral institutions created under the
US led liberal international order. As mentioned previously,
the president recently took steps to include other countries in
contesting military aggression in the South China Sea. But these
actions are just one example of multilateral movement organized
by the United States. The National Security Strategy and National
Defense Strategy both call for team efforts with countries around
Asia to prevent the formation of Chinese regional hegemony,
but only time will tell if the president continues to pursue these
policies in regards to military action. On the other hand, as
detailed by President Trump’s major protectionist economic
policies towards Asia, he wishes to go alone in stopping China’s
economic coercion. The attitude of the administration runs
the risk of the US approach towards balancing China being
more confrontational than competitive.58 Here lies the most
fatal flaw in all of President Trump’s policies towards Asia.
The failure in this policy is that the president is separating
the United States from the liberal international order that China
is abusing for its own benefit. Instead of attacking China, the
United States should write new trade and investment rules for
the twenty-first century.59 If President Trump’s new trade and
investment rules follow a protectionist model, they will fail
miserably. The rest of the world, including China, has explicitly
shown that they will continue lowering trade barriers and
interacting through multilateral fronts. This is evident through
the signing of the CPTPP and the international support for China’
Belt and Road Initiative. Furthermore, the United States has
already experienced backlash for protectionist proposals by the
Kurt M. Campbell and Ely Ratner, “The China Reckoning: How Beijing Defied American
Expectations,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 97, no. 2 (March/April, 2018): 60-70.
59
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Trump Administration. As the leader of the current international
order, the United States has the ability to help reshape the
order, but it should not flip it on its head. It should strengthen
the system to fix flaws that allow for Chinese coercion, but the
United States should not go about it alone. Ian Bremmer argued
for increased economic interdependence with China to ensure
that any action China takes to destabilize the United States or
its overseas interests will be met with a high cost.60 Slamming
investigations and tariffs that attack China will only reduce
economic interdependence, which makes it easier for China to
economically coerce its neighbors without facing punishment.
The United States under President Trump heads in
a direction that will result in the country’s presence in Asia
being severely compromised. China is already the largest
trading partner with many countries in Asia.61 Countries in
Asia continue to increase economic interdependence while
President Trump’s United States moves towards protectionism.
If this trend continues and China completes its Belt and Road
Initiative, it will become the center of trade across the entire
Eurasian continent. China will also find it easier to bend its
neighbors to its will with economic incentives. Not only will
this further remove United States economic presence in Asia, it
will make Indo-Pacific countries less inclined to prevent China’s
military expansion in the South China Sea.62 Once this happens,
the United States will only have its own military at its disposal,
and it is difficult to imagine the United States starting an all
out war with China. As Mearsheimer argues, there is military
power and socioeconomic power, and socioeconomic power
is what funds military power.63 Therefore, the continuation
60
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of US protectionism under President Donald Trump only
assists China’s objective of achieving regional hegemony. US
protectionist policies make it easier for China to gain economic
dominance in Asia, which may lead to military dominance and
the eventual removal of the United States presence in the region.
It is important to note that the theory followed in this
paper is not the only framework for observing the situation in
Asia. One could also follow defensive realist theory, which
would still assume that China’s actions intend to increase its
power. However, defensive realism would assume China will
never seek to expand its power into global hegemony, and it
will coexist peacefully with its neighbors and the United States.
While an argument can be made for either side, or any other
political framework of thought, the Asia-Pacific region is an
especially important one to the United States for reasons other
than preventing a hegemon from forming. It contains the biggest
trade waterway in the world, the South China Sea, and the
region’s most powerful country, China, is an authoritarian state.
Without a United States presence in Asia it is impossible to
know how China will mold the region. However, the possibility
of an authoritarian wave led by China spreading throughout the
continent should be enough to scare the United States into taking
action. The United States created the liberal international order
based on democracy after World War II and fought hard to expand
it, so why turn back to protectionism now and run the risk of a
Chinese regional hegemony reversing its vision for the world?
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